Concluding Remarks
The notion of privately computable functions can be restated in terms of simulations. A function is privately computable if it has a protocol where each party can exactly simulate the communication given its input and the value of the function. In this form, privacy strongly resembles the notion of perfect zero knowledge as de ned by Goldwasser, Micali, and Racko 9].
Protocols computing non-private functions can also be described in the language of simulations. A protocol for is h-private if each party can simulate the communication exactly, given its input and the value of h.
In the early version of 9] there is an attempt to de ne knowledge complexity quantitatively, in terms of probabilities of successful simulations. This formulation seems to be ad-hoc and unnatural 7]. An alternative formulation can be based on the approach presented here: A protocol reveals at most k bits of knowledge if its execution can be perfectly simulated given the input x and the value of a function h(x), whose range has size 2 k . Recently, Goldreich 7] independently proposed another formulation, which is more general than ours, and Goldreich and Petrank 8] suggested several de nitions for the amount of knowledge revealed in an interactive proof system and studied the relations between these de nitions. We believe that these de nitions have the potential of yielding interesting results in the computationally bounded context.
Another interesting problem is to quantify more accurately the relations between I c , I c?i , and I i . For example, is I c (f) 2I i (f) for every Boolean function f?
Acknowledgments
We thank Oded Goldreich for many stimulating discussions.
References 1] Abadi M., J. Feigenbaum, and J. Kilian, \On Hiding Information from an Oracle", JCSS, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1989, pp. 21{50 . 2] Beaver, D., \Perfect Privacy for Two Party Protocols", Technical Report TR-11-89, Harvard University, 1989 . 3] Ben-or M., S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson, \Completeness Theorems for Non-Cryptographic Fault-Tolerant Distributed Computation" Proc. of 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1988, pp. 1-10 . 4] Chor, B., and E. Kushilevitz, \A Zero-One Law for Boolean Privacy", SIAM Jour. on Disc.
Math., Vol. 4, No. 1, February 1991, pp. 36-47 . Earlier version in Proc. of 21th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1989, pp. 62-72 . 5] Cover, T., and J. Thomas, \Elements of Information Theory", John Wiley and Sons, 1991. 6] Erdos P., and J. Spencer, Probabilistic Methods in Combinatorics, Academic Press, New York, 1974. 25 Theorem 10: A. For all functions f 2 F n , I i (f) I c?i (f) n + 1 2 :
B. For most functions f 2 F n , n ? log n ? 1 2 I i (f) I c?i (f) : Proof: A. The rst inequality is by Theorem 9. For the second inequality, we present the following protocol which has I n+1 2 : P X ips a fair coin and transmits its 0-1 outcome C to P Y . If C is 0, P Y transmits y and P X computes and transmits f(x; y). If C is 1, they reverse the roles. I.e., P X transmits x and P Y computes and transmits f(x; y). As C is independent of X, we have:
I(X; (X; Y )jY ) I(X; (X; Y )jY; C) = X c2f0;1g
Pr(c)I(X; (X; Y )jY; c) 1 2 1 + 1 2 n = n + 1 2 : and the symmetric argument shows that I(Y ; (X; Y )jX) n+1 2 .
B. For every input (x; y) 2 f0;1g n f0;1g n , the protocol de nes a probability distribution on the sequences (x; y) of transmitted bits. Let s be a sequence of bits. De ne (s) def = f(x;y) : (x; y) can assume the value sg to be the set of inputs for which may exchange s. As for deterministic protocols, it is easy to see that if is error-free for f, then for all s, (s) is an f-monochromatic rectangle. The quantity Pr(s) now depends not only on the input distribution (X; Y ), but also on the randomization of the protocol. However, the proof proceeds as in Theorem 8. It is possible to further extend the class of randomized protocols by considering protocols which might err. We say that a protocol A computes f with " advantage if 8x;y 2 f0;1g n : Pr(L A (x; y) = f(x; y)) 1 2 + " :
The quantities I " c , I " c?i , and I " i are de ned analogously, where the protocols considered are " advantage protocols. While Lemma 2 implies that I " c = I det where, this time, the function may be random, i.e., (x; y) may be a random variable for some, or all, (x; y). We say that is determined by h and x if for all x 2 f0;1g n and all y 1 ; y 2 2 f0;1g n , h(x; y 1 ) = h(x; y 2 ) implies (x; y 1 ) = (x; y 2 ); namely, the probability distribution of the random variable (x; y) is determined by x and h(x; y). Equivalently, for all values x; y; h, and s of X; Y; h(X; Y ), and (X; Y ), Pr(sjx; y; h) = Pr(sjx; h) :
We then de ne the measures I c , I i , and I c?i just as we de ned their deterministic counterparts I det c , I det i , and I det c?i , except that the minimization in Equations (4), (5), and (6) is performed over all protocols, not just deterministic ones.
The following observation will be useful in generalizing the proofs given for deterministic protocols to arbitrary ones. We rst prove the analog of Theorem 6.
Theorem 9: For all functions f, I i (f) I c?i (f) I c (f) : Proof: As in Theorem 6, the rst (left) inequality follows from the de nition. To prove the second inequality, let h be a function achieving I c (f) in De nition 4 and let be a protocol for f that is determined by h and y and by h and x. Lemma 8 observed that X and (X; Y ) are mutually independent given Y and h(X; Y ). Hence, by the Data-Processing Inequality, cf., Theorem 1.5 in 11], we again obtain Inequality (8):
I(Y ; (X; Y )jX) I(Y ; h(X; Y )jX) and the proof continues as in Theorem 6.
Clearly, allowing randomized protocols cannot increase the amount of information that must be divulged during the computation of f. However, for I det c , randomized protocols cannot reduce that quantity either, as it follows from Lemma 2 that for all functions f, I c (f) = I det c (f). (1 + (1 ? ) n) 2 + (1 ? 2 ) n 2 2 + n 2 : and part (B) follows.
Randomized Protocols
To extend I det c , I det c?i , and I det i to encompass randomized protocols, we need to generalize two de nitions made in the last subsection. A randomized protocol induces a probability distribution (x; y) on the bits communicated when P X has x and P Y has y. We therefore view (x; y) as a random variable. Generalizing de nition (3), let and h be functions de ned over f0;1g n f0;1g n 
The theorem follows as I det c?i (f) is the minimum of I A over all deterministic protocols A computing f.
We proceed to show that for most functions f 2 F n , I det c?i (f) is roughly n while I det i (f) is about Theorem 7: For all functions f 2 F n , I det c?i (f) n ? log r f ? 1 : Proof: We show that in every decomposition of f0;1g n f0;1g n into f-constant rectangles, there is either a row or a column that intersects at least 2 n 2r f rectangles. Lemma 7 then implies the result.
Let R = fR 1 ; : : :; R k g be a decomposition of f0;1g n f0;1g n into f-constant rectangles where R i = X i Y i . By de nition, minfjX i j;jY i jg r f for all i 2 f1;:::;kg. Recall that`r ow (x) is the number of rectangles intersecting row x, and that`c ol (y) is the number of rectangles intersecting column y. Then Recall that a rectangle is a Cartesian-product in f0;1g n f0;1g n , and that every deterministic protocol A induces a partition X 1 Y 1 ; : : :; X k Y k of f0;1g n f0;1g n into rectangles. For each x 2 f0;1g n let`r ow (x) def = jfi 2 f1;:::;kg : x 2 X i gj (7) be the number of rectangles induced by A that intersect row x. Similarly, for y 2 f0;1g n , let`c ol (y) be the number of rectangles induced by A that intersect column y. A. For all deterministic protocols A,
B. For all f 2 F n , I det c?i (f) = minflog`A : A is a deterministic protocol computing fg: Proof: Part (B) follows from (A) and the de nition of I det c?i (f); we prove (A). For every deterministic protocol A, every distribution (X; Y ) and every x 2 f0;1g n , I(Y ; A(X;Y )jx) H(A(X; Y )jx) log`r ow (x) log`A ; hence I(Y ; A(X;Y )jX) log`A. Similarly I(X; A(X;Y )jY ) log`A, and I A log`A follows. To obtain the reverse inequality, nd a row or a column in f0;1g n intersecting`A rectangles. Pick`A points in this row (or column), one from each rectangle, and let (X; Y ) be distributed uniformly over these points.
In Corollary 4, we will use this interpretation to prove that most functions f 2 F n have I det c?i (f) n ? log n ? 2. But rst, we relate the three measures. (4) and let A be a deterministic protocol for f which is determined both by h and y and by h and x. As A is determined by h and x, all distributions (X; Y ) satisfy:
input (x; y) 2 f0;1g n f0;1g n and can therefore be viewed as a function over f0;1g n f0;1g n . In that sense, we rede ne I det c :
I det c (f) def = minflog jrange(h)j : there exists a deterministic protocol for f that is determined both by h and x and by h and yg :
While I det c is well de ned even if no probability distribution on the input space is assumed, the de nitions of I det i and I det c?i implicitly assume an underlying distribution. We view x and y as a pair (X; Y ) of random variables drawn from some a-priori distribution which is known to both parties. P Y knows Y , hence the amount of information he obtains about X during the execution of a protocol A is the conditional mutual information I(X; A(X;Y )jY ). Similarly, A provides P X with I(Y ; A(X;Y )jX) bits of information about Y . Every Boolean function has a deterministic protocol computing it in which P X learns at most one bit of information: P X transmits X, then P Y responds with the value of the function. Likewise, every Boolean function has a protocol that provides P Y with at most one bit of information. We will show that for some functions, all protocols provide at least one of P X and P Y with a lot of information. be the minimum, over all deterministic protocols computing f, of the information they divulge.
(Note that, as X and Y range over a nite range, there is a nite number of protocols so the minimum is well de ned.) We then de ne
is a random pair distributed over f0;1g n f0;1g n g to be the amount of information that at least one communicator must learn about the other`s random variable if they compute f using a deterministic protocol, maximized over all possible underlying distributions of (X; Y ). I det c?i is more applicable when the underlying distribution is not known, and in that respect, is 17
By the choice of the d i 's we have
Therefore the length of any branch in the nal tree is bounded above by
This completes the proof of the theorem.
I i and I c?i
So far, we considered only one measure of privacy-cost: the combinatorial measure I c . Next, we investigate two other measures: an information-theoretic measure I i , and a measure I c?i that has both combinatorial and information-theoretic aspects. Each of the measures has a deterministic counterpart (I det i and I det c?i ), denoting the amount of information that must be divulged according to the measure if the communicators are restricted to deterministic protocols. I det c was de ned in Section 3, but Theorem ?? showed that I det c = I c . As before, let F n be the set of Boolean functions de ned over f0;1g n f0;1g n . Corollary 2 shows that for most functions in F n :
I det c (and therefore I c ) is about n; We now show that for most functions in F n :
I det c?i is about n while I c?i is about n=2. both I det i and I i are about n=2;
We partition this section in two. In the rst subsection, we consider the deterministic measures. In subsection 7.2, we discuss randomized protocols. At the cost of some repetition, this enables us to provide a clearer, more intuitive, exposition, and to point out the di erences between the di erent measures. We assume that the reader is familiar with basic information-theoretic quantities, such as entropy and mutual information. For details, see 5, 11].
Deterministic Protocols
Let and h be functions de ned over f0;1g n f0;1g n . We say that is determined by h and x if for all x 2 f0;1g n and y 1 ; y 2 2 f0;1g n , h(x; y 1 ) = h(x; y 2 ) imply (x; y 1 ) = (x; y 2 ):
We similarly say that is determined by h and y if a party that knows y and h(x; y) can infer (x; y). A deterministic protocol on f0;1g n f0;1g n assigns a sequence of transmitted bits to every Lemma 5: Let T be a tree, and S a set of nodes in T with the least common ancestor property.
Suppose that for every v = 2 S there is an ancestor w 2 S such that the length of the path from w to v is at most d. Let T 0 be the modi ed tree, resulting from applying ShortCut(S) to the tree T.
Then the length of every branch in T 0 is at most 2 jSj + d. Proof: Take an arbitrary branch in T 0 . Note that after applying ShortCut(R Q ; Q) to T, the nodes R and Q are in distance 2 in T 0 . Consider the rst pair of adjacent nodes on this branch which do not correspond to nodes in S. By the construction of the shortcut set, it follows that below this pair, there are no shortcut pairs. Therefore the length below this pair is at most d. Thus the longest branch in T 0 can be of length at most 2 jSj + d.
We now give a method to construct a set S with the least common ancestor property, in a way which balances its size, jSj, with the distance d. Lemma 6: Let d be an integer (d 2). Given a decomposition tree T with M nodes, there is a least common ancestor set S satisfying jSj 2M d , such that every v = 2 S has an ancestor w 2 S which is at most d nodes above v.
Proof: We construct S in two stages. In the rst stage we iterate adding one node to S and remove a subset of nodes from consideration. For each node R of T, let w(R) denote the number of descendants of R. While the tree has at least d nodes, it is possible to nd a node with w(R) d, but W(Q) < d for every son Q of R. We add R to S, remove the subtree rooted at R, and repeat the process until less than d nodes are left.
In the second stage we close the set S under the least common ancestor of pairs, and nally add the root of T to S. Denote by S T T the resulting set. Clearly S T is a least common ancestor set. The number of nodes added to S T in the rst stage cannot exceed M d , since each such node resulted in the removal of at least d nodes from the set. Together with the nodes added in the second stage, S T can be viewed as a tree. The second stage nodes correspond to internal nodes of degree 2 in this tree. Thus the number of the second stage nodes does not exceed the number of the rst stage nodes. The total is bounded by
The nal step in the proof of Theorem 5 is to show how to choose (sequentially) k least common ancestor sets S 1 ; S 2 ; : : :; S k . Each of these sets yields one shortcut at the cost of revealing one additional bit, so overall k bits of additional information are revealed. Each set transforms the original protocol and its decomposition tree. Denote M 1 = M; T 1 = T and S 1 = S T 1 , where the parameter d 1 is taken as d 1 = M 1? 1 k+1 . Removing the nodes of S 1 from T 1 , we get a forest of disjoint trees, each having fewer than d 1 nodes. We apply the construction again to each of these subtrees T (j) 2 independently, choosing d 2 = M 1? 2 k+1 . In the i-th step we apply the construction with parameter d i = M 1? i k+1 to a collection of disjoint trees, each of size M i < d i?1 = M 1? i?1 k+1 . The length of any branch in the nal tree is at most P k i=1 2 jS T i j + d k . This is the case since any branch which leaves the set S i does not go back to it. Thus, the worst case scenario is a branch going through all S 1 nodes, then through all S 2 nodes etc., and nally (after going through S k nodes) going through at most < d k \free" nodes.
Proof: Let (x; y 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) be two inputs with g(x; y 1 ) = g(x; y 2 ), and h(x; y 1 ) = h(x; y 2 ).
(Similar proof holds for pairs of inputs of the form (x 1 ; y) and (x 2 ; y)). Since F is g-private and deterministic, the communication S F satis es S F (x; y 1 ) = S F (x; y 2 ). Furthermore, the g-privacy of F implies that (x; y 1 ) 2 R , (x; y 2 ) 2 R (otherwise, P X can distinguish between (x; y 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) by the execution of F). Similarly (x; y 1 ) 2 Q , (x; y 2 ) 2 Q. Therefore we need consider only the three following cases: Both (x; y 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) are not in R. For such inputs the protocol G proceeds exactly the same as F, and thus S G (x; y 1 ) = S G (x; y 2 ). Both (x; y 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) are in Q. For such inputs the protocol G works the same as F except that two messages are added, when reaching R, in which P X sends one bit indicating that x 2 C 2 , and P Y sends one bit indicating that y i 2 D 2 (i = 1; 2). Thus, S G (x; y 1 ) = S G (x; y 2 ). Both (x; y 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) are in RnQ. Since h(x; y 1 ) = h(x; y 2 ) then either both y 1 ; y 2 2 (D 1 nD 2 ) or both y 1 ; y 2 2 D 2 . Without loss of generality assume that y 1 ; y 2 2 (D 1 nD 2 ). For such inputs the protocol G works the same as F except that two messages are added, when reaching R, in which P X sends one bit indicating that x 2 C 2 , and P Y sends one bit indicating that y i 2 (D 1 n D 2 ) (i = 1; 2). Thus, S G (x; y 1 ) = S G (x; y 2 ). Notice that our argument makes use of h's value only for (x; y) 2 R n Q. Therefore, h can get arbitrary values ( 's) outside R n Q.
A single shortcut can reduce the length of a single long branch, at the cost of revealing one extra bit of information. In order to reduce the length of many long branches, we would like to do many shortcuts simultaneously, and still reveal only a single bit of additional information. The key observation to this step is that if R 1 ; Q 1 , R 2 and Q 2 correspond to nodes in F's decomposition tree with Q 1 R 1 , Q 2 R 2 , and (R 1 nQ 1 )\(R 2 nQ 2 ) = ;, then ShortCut(R 1 ; Q 1 ) and ShortCut(R 2 ; Q 2 ) can be done simultaneously. The functions h 1 , h 2 corresponding to the two shortcuts have enough degrees of freedom which prevent con icts in the relevant regions. This is since h 1 has non-values only inside R 1 n Q 1 , while h 2 has non-values only inside R 2 n Q 2 , and these two sets are disjoint. This argument clearly generalizes to any number of pairs R i ; Q i with pairwise disjoint R i n Q i . We now describe how to choose these pairs so that a signi cant length reduction is achieved.
Let V be a set of pairs of submatrices, (R i ; Q i ), corresponding to nodes on F's decomposition tree which satisfy Q i R i . We say that V is a legal shortcut set if every (R i ; Q i ); (R j ; Q j ) 2 V , satisfy (R i n Q i ) \ (R j n Q j ) = ;. By the preceding discussion, all pairs in a legal shortcut set can be shortcut simultaneously. We say that a set S of nodes in the tree T has the least common ancestor property if S contains the root of T, and for every two nodes in S, their least common ancestor is also in S. A set S with the least common ancestor property induces a legal shortcut set in the following way: Let R; Q 2 S such that R is ancestor of Q, and the branch leading from R to Q has no other element of S. De ne R Q as the rst son of R in the branch leading to Q. The shortcut set contains the pairs (R Q ; Q) for all such R and Q. It is easy to see that if (R Q ; Q) and (R 0 Q 0; Q 0 ) are included in the set, then indeed (R Q n Q) \ (R 0 Q 0 n Q 0 ) = ;. Any non-empty intersection can result only from a situation in which there exists a node v in the tree that is below R and is an ancestor of both Q and R 0 . Such a situation contradicts the common ancestor property of S. We de ne ShortCut(S) as the simultaneous application of ShortCut(R Q ; Q) for all pairs in the induced legal shortcut set.
Theorem 5: Let f : f0;1g n f0;1g n ! f0;1g 2n be any function with I c (f) `, and let 1 k n ?`. There is a protocol which computes f, reveals at most`+ k bits of information, and requires O(k 2 (2n+1)=(k+1) ) messages.
Proof of Theorem 5
By the supposition there is a function g : f0;1g n f0;1g n ! f0;1g`, and a g-private protocol F for computing f. Using Lemma 2, we can assume that F is deterministic. Denote by T the decomposition tree corresponding to the protocol F. Let M denote the number of nodes in T. Since the number of inputs (x; y) is 2 2n , and each leaf contains one or more inputs, M 2 2n+1 (this assumes that every step of F makes some progress). We construct from F a protocol G which reveals at most`+ k bits of information, and uses at most O(k M 1 k+1 ) messages. The main idea in the new protocol is to make appropriate \shortcuts" in the original tree. Suppose that the submatrices R = C 1 D 1 and Q = C 2 D 2 correspond to two nodes in the decomposition tree T, such that Q R. This means that R and Q are on the same branch in T, with Q below R.
Modifying the original protocol by the ShortCut(R; Q) operation causes the following change (see Figure ? ?): If the parties reach the R node, they rst check if their input (x; y) is in Q. If it is, they make a \shortcut" to node Q, that is, they continue the protocol from that node. Otherwise ((x; y) 2 R n Q), they continue the protocol from R as before. Formally, in the modi ed protocol,
P X sends one bit indicating whether x 2 C 2 : P Y sends one bit indicating whether y 2 D 2 : If x 2 C 2 and y 2 D 2 then the protocol continues from Q = C 2 D 2 : Otherwise, the protocol continues from the point R: Let d be the length of the path from node R to node Q in the original tree T. That is, for inputs (x; y) 2 Q, d messages of communication are needed, after the parties nd out that (x; y) 2 R, to nd out that (x; y) 2 Q. In the new protocol, the number of messages needed after the parties nd out that (x; y) 2 R, to nd out that (x; y) 2 Q is just 2, so the total number of messages (for (x; y) 2 Q) is decreased by d ? 2. For (x; y) 2 (R n Q), on the other hand, the number of messages in the modi ed protocol increases by 2, while for (x; y) = 2 R, this number remains unchanged. In addition to the change in messages, the modi ed protocol might also reveal additional information.
We claim that at most one additional bit is revealed by ShortCut(R; Q): If (x; y) is in R n Q then P Y learns whether x 2 C 2 , and P X learns whether y 2 D 2 . For any other inputs (that is, (x; y) = 2 R or (x; y) 2 Q) no extra information is given. Formally, Lemma 4: Let F be any g-private protocol for computing f. Let if (x; y) = 2 R or (x; y) 2 Q where is a dontcare (which can get arbitrary Boolean values for every (x; y) in the domain Q R). Then G is a g h { private protocol for computing f. and can compute g(x; y). On the other hand, if h k = k then the parties execute the original protocol for g on the truncated inputs (x k+1 : : : x n ; y k+1 : : : y n ). This takes at most 2 (2 n?k ?1) more messages.
The next example demonstrates a function f with the strongest possible tradeo . Any private computation f has message-complexity 2 (2 n ? 1). However, while revealing only one bit of additional information, f can be computed in two messages (and using O(n) information bits).
Example 6: De ne f as follows (see Figure 2 ): (1) f(x; x) = f(x; x + 1) = 2 x (for x = 0; 1; : : : ; 2 n ? 2).
(2) f(y + 1; y) = f(y + 2; y) = 2y + 1 (for y = 0; 1; : : : ; 2 n ? 3).
(3) Otherwise f(x; y) = x y.
Take the Boolean function h(x; y) = 1 () x = y. Then the simple 2-message protocol in which P Y sends y and P X answers with f(x; y) is f h -private. Intuitively, the only privacy requirements with respect to P X are given by the pairs of inputs of the form (x; x) and (x; x + 1). The function h gets di erent values on (x; x) and (x; x + 1) and thus in a f h -private protocol P X is allowed to distinguish between them.
The next theorem concerns the general tradeo between additional information and the number of communication messages. Before stating it, we recall that private computations of private functions on the domain f0;1g n f0;1g n might take up to (2 n ) communication messages 10]. Theorem 4: Let f : f0;1g n f0;1g n ! f0;1g 2n be a private function, and let 1 k n.
There is a protocol which computes f, reveals at most k bits of additional information, and requires O(k 2 (2n+1)=(k+1) ) messages. 6 Additional Information Versus Rounds Complexity Every function f de ned on f0;1g n f0;1g n can be computed in two messages using n + 1 bits.
Kushilevitz 10] showed that for any 1 m 2 (2 n ? 1), there are functions whose private computation requires m messages. In this section, we explore a possible tradeo between privacy and communication messages.
We begin with two examples of private functions f : f0;1g n f0;1g n ! f0;1g 2n , whose messagecomplexity can be signi cantly reduced if additional information can be revealed. We then show a general tradeo : If f is de ned over f0;1g n f0;1g n and I c (f) `, then for every 0 k n ?t here exists an O(k 2 2n=(k+1) )-message protocol for f which reveals`+ k bits. This is meaningful when any computation of f that reveals at most`information bits requires exponentially many messages (as we mentioned above, 10] showed that such functions exist).
Example 5: De ne g as follows (see Figure 1 ):
g(x; y) = ( ?1 if x = y min(x; y) if x 6 = y By 10], this function is private and has message-complexity of 2 (2 n ? 1). One simple way of trading additional information for message-complexity in g is the following: P X starts the protocol by revealing the k most signi cant bits of its input, x, to P Y . If the k most signi cant bits of y are di erent from the k most signi cant bits of x then P Y knows who holds the minimum. Otherwise, if the k most signi cant bits of both parties are the same, the domain of the function is reduced to n ? k bits, so that now 2 (2 n?k ? 1) + 1 messages of communication su ce.
One can do even better { for every 1 k n, there is a protocol that reveals log(k + 1) bits of additional information and takes 2 (2 n?k + k ? 1) messages. For every k in the interval above, we de ne a function h k as follows: h k (x; y) = maxfj j 0 j k ; x 1 : : :x j = y 1 : : :y j g (the length of common pre x of most signi cant bits in x and y, up to k). The protocol goes as follows: the parties compute h k by exchanging bit by bit (at most 2k messages) until nding the rst di erent bit. If h k 6 = k then the parties know which of them holds the minimum Since the protocol is h-private, in any row (or column) h cannot obtain the same value over two di erent rectangles. Hence h obtains at least 2 n?1 =r f values over some row.
We use the lemma to lower bound I c (f) for \most" and for some speci c Binary functions. Let F n be the set of Boolean functions over f0;1g n f0;1g n . De ne F n def = ff 2 F n : r f < 2ng to be the set of functions in F n whose monochromatic squares all have width < 2n. The following standard argument shows that most functions in F n have r f < 2n. For m = 2, one can verify by inspection that for both values of z, jR z j = 3 = log 2 2 + 2. For m > 2, suppose, without loss of generality, that P X sends in the rst message one of j possible strings (j 2). This rst message partitions I m into j \horizontal" rectangles. At least one of these rectangles contains at least dm=je diagonal points (z; z). By the structure of I m , this rectangle contains a submatrix F F which is isomorphic to I(dm=je). By the induction hypothesis, for at least one of the z 2 F, the size of the induced set R z (in F F) is at least 2 + log 2 dm=je 2+log 2 m?log 2 j: In addition, the set R z contain at least j?1 communication strings from I m nF F (as at least the rst message sent on inputs in the other j ? 1 \horizontal" rectangles is di erent). Overall, jR z j 2 + j ? 1 ? log 2 j + log 2 m 2 + log 2 m (with equality only for j = 2). As R z = fA(x;z)j0 x m ? 1g fA(z;y)j0 y m ? 1g, the last inequality implies, without loss of generality, that the size of the set fA(z;y)j0 y m ? 1g is at least (2 + log 2 m)=2. Now if the protocol A is h-private, every y 1 ; y 2 for which A(z;y 1 ) 6 = A(z;y 2 ), must satisfy h(z; y 1 ) 6 = h(z; y 2 ). Therefore if equ in the domain I m is h-private, then jrange(h)j (2 + log 2 m)=2: Substituting m = 2 n , we have jrange(h)j 1 + n=2; and so I c (f) log 2 n. 
has log n I c (comp) log(n + 1) :
As mentioned in Section 2, every protocol for f partitions f0;1g n f0;1g n into f-constant rectangles. The width of a rectangle R = A B is minfjAj; jBjg. R is vertical if jAj jBj and horizontal otherwise. Let r f be the largest width of an f-constant rectangle. The next lemma relates r f to I c (f) and is useful in proving lower bounds on I c (f) for certain functions. Theorem 3: For every function f de ned over f0;1g n f0;1g n , I c (f) n ? log r f ? 1 : Proof: By Lemma 2 we need to consider only deterministic protocols. We show that if some deterministic protocol for f is h-private, then there is a row or a column over which h attains at least 2 n?1 =r f values.
Consider the rectangular partition of f0;1g n f0;1g n inducted by the protocol. Without loss of generality, at least 2 2n?1 elements of f0;1g n f0;1g n belong to vertical rectangles (otherwise, interchange rows and columns below). Therefore, there is a row which has at least 2 n?1 elements contained in vertical rectangles. As the protocol computes f, all the rectangles are f-constant, and the intersection of any row with a vertical f-constant rectangle has size of at most r f . Hence, there must be at least 2 n?1 =r f rectangles intersecting that row.
We show that min is not private and that 0 < E(min) 1.
For every a, min(a; a) = min(a; a + 1) = min(a + 1; a) = a and min(a + 1; a + 1) = a + 1. Hence M min contains a forbidden submatrix (see Subsection 3.1 for de nition). The PrivacyCharacterization Theorem implies that min is not private and so E(min) > 0.
To show that E(min) < 1, consider the following protocol.
For i from 1 to n, or until the rst`1' is transmitted:
(1) P X transmits`1' if x = i and transmits`0' otherwise, (2) P Y transmits`1' if y = i and transmits`0' otherwise. It is easy to verify that when communication ends, P X knows only min(x; y) (if x y, the protocol ends after step (1) for i = x) and that P Y knows only min(x; y) and whether x = y. Let equ(x; y) def = 1 if x = y 0 otherwise.
Then the protocol computes min and is (min equ)-private. Hence, I c (min) log jrange(min equ)j = log jrange(min)j + 1 ; and E(min) = I c (min) ? log jrange(min)j 1.
As mentioned in Section 3, this example shows that the bound proved in Lemma 1 is not tight.
It can be shown 13] that C D (min) n, and yet I c (min) log(n + 1). Example 2: We show that for the equality function de ned in Equation (1), log n I c (equ) log(n + 1) :
First we establish the upper bound. Let x = (x 1 ; : : :;x n ), y = (y 1 ; : : : ;y n ), and de ne h(x; y) def = minfi jx i 6 = y i g if x 6 = y, n + 1 if x = y. Consider the following protocol: For i from 1 to n:
(1) P X sends x i to P Y .
(2) If x i 6 = y i then P Y transmits`0' and the execution terminates. If x i = y i then P Y sends`1'.
It is easy to verify that the protocol computes equ correctly and that it is h-private as the only information revealed, besides the value of f(x; y), is the rst index i where x i 6 = y i . Hence, I c (f) log jrange(h)j = log(n + 1) :
To prove the lower bound, let I m be the m m identity matrix. Note that I m is the restriction of M equ to the rst m rows and columns. We prove by induction on m that any deterministic protocol A which computes the identity function on I m , there is a z 2 f0;1;:::;m ? 1g such that the size of 8 and A(x;y 2 ) are identical. This implies that in A 0 the same communication string is sent on both input-pairs (x; y 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) and so A 0 is f h 1 -private for P X . Similar argument holds for P Y , and therefore A 0 is (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private. As A 0 is a deterministic protocol, it is necessarily strongly (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private.
Theorem 2: Let f; h 1 and h 2 be arbitrary functions. If f is weakly (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private then there exists a pair of functions g 1 and g 2 with jrange(g i )j jrange(h i )j (i = 1; 2) such that f g 1 g 2 is strongly private.
Proof: According to Lemma 2, there is a deterministic (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private protocol A which computes f. In Section 2, we de ned for every communication string s, A ?1 (s) = f(x;y)jA(x;y) = sg and noted that the set A ?1 (s) is a generalized rectangle A ?1 (s) = C(s) D(s) (C(s); D(s) f0;1g n ). De ne the function g 1 such that for every communication string s, the value of g 1 (x; y) is constant over every row in C(s). That is, for every x 2 C(s) g 1 (x; y) = h 1 (x; y s ) where y s is some xed arbitrary element of D(s). We de ne g 2 (x; y) similarly, such that g 2 (x; y) is constant over every column in D(s).
Clearly range(g i ) range(h i ) (i = 1; 2). For the function g 1 , the party P X can determine g 1 (x; y) given x and A(x;y). Similarly P Y can determine g 2 (x; y) given y and A(x;y). This property makes it possible to transform the protocol A into a new protocol A 0 which computes f g 1 g 2 privately.
We rst show that A is a (g 1 ; g 2 )-private protocol for computing f. Suppose f(x; y 1 ) = f(x; y 2 ) and g 1 (x; y 1 ) = g 1 (x; y 2 ). We show that this implies A(x;y 1 ) = A(x;y 2 ). In other words we should prove that (x; y 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) are in the same A ?1 (s) (similar proof holds for pairs of the type (x 1 ; y) and (x 2 ; y)). Suppose towards a contradiction that (x; y 1 ) 2 A ?1 (s 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) 2 A ?1 (s 2 ). Since g 1 (x; y 1 ) = g 1 (x; y 2 ) then there are y 0 1 2 D(s 1 ) and y 0 2 2 D(s 2 ) such that h 1 (x; y 0 1 ) = h 1 (x; y 0 2 ). But then the communication on (x; y 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) di er -contradicting the fact that A is (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private.
We modify the protocol A and get a new protocol A 0 which computes f g 1 g 2 . The protocol A 0 is similar to A with two additional messages in which P X computes g 1 (x; y) (note that x and A(x;y) completely determines the value of g 1 (x; y)) and P Y computes g 2 (x; y). Since A computes f (f g 1 ; f g 2 )-privately, it is easy to verify that A 0 privately computes f g 1 g 2 . Corollary 1: If f is weakly f h {private then there is a function g with jrange(g)j jrange(h)j 2 , such that f g is strongly private.
Bounds on I c
We bound the privacy cost of various random and explicit functions. Upper bounds are proved by demonstrating the appropriate protocols and lower-bound proofs employ communication-complexity techniques in conjunction with Lemma 2. We begin with three examples.
Example 1: View x and y as integers in f0;:::;2 n ? 1g and consider the function min(x; y) def = x if x y, y otherwise.
4 Relations to Private Computations
We prove the equivalence of weak and strong h-privacy. This equivalence is useful in proving lower bounds on I c (f), as it means that it su ces to consider deterministic protocols that compute f.
Let f h (x; y) be the function f concatenated with h (i.e. f(x; y) h(x; y)). We relate the question of whether f has an f h -private protocol to the question of whether f h is private. Since any computation of f reveals at least f's value, it is convenient to consider f h -private protocols for f: The amount of additional information in such protocol is at most dlog 2 jrange(h)je. Proof: Assume that f h is weakly private. By the Privacy-Characterization Theorem, f h is strongly private, and by the Round-Complexity Theorem, there exists a deterministic protocol A which computes f h strongly privately. We modify A to a new protocol A 0 by adding one more message, in which the party receiving the last message in A (consisting of f h (x; y)) sends f(x; y).
It is easy to verify that the modi ed protocol computes f and is strongly h{private.
The converse does not hold. An f h -private protocol for f need not compute h, and therefore cannot in general be transformed into a private protocol for f h . For example, a constant f is f h -private for any h, but if h is not private then certainly f h is not private.
However, it is possible to prove a modi ed version of the reverse direction: If f is f h -private, then there is a function g, whose range is a subset of range(h) range(h), such that f g is private.
We start with a lemma.
Lemma 2: Let f; h 1 and h 2 be arbitrary functions. f is weakly (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private if and only if f is strongly (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private.
Proof: Let A be a weakly (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private protocol for f. Suppose that P X sends the rst message, m 1 , in A. De ne an equivalence relation 1 on the input pairs (x; y) by (x 1 ; y) 1 (x 2 ; y) if and only if the messages sent by P X in on inputs x 1 and x 2 are identically distributed. Similarly, 2 is de ned according to the distribution of m 2 (given the previous message m 1 ), and it re nes the equivalence classes of 1 . In general, the equivalence relation i is de ned according to the distribution of the i-th message m i (given all previous messages). The relation i decomposes the input pairs (x; y) into equivalence classes C i 1 ; C i 2 ; : : :; C i t , re ning the i?1 equivalence classes in a manner depending only on the input (x or y) of the corresponding processor (P X or P Y ). As there are only 2 2n input pairs, the number of equivalence classes, t, cannot exceed 2 2n . Furthermore, the number of messages i required till i stabilizes is nite, even if A has in nite runs.
These observations lead to the modi ed protocol, A 0 . In the i-th message of A 0 , the corresponding party sends the index j of the i equivalence class, as determined by its input (x or y) and the i?1 equivalence class. The protocol terminates when the current equivalence class is stable (namely it does not get more re ned in future messages). At this point both parties know exactly the distribution of messages A(x;y) on the input pair (x; y). Since the probability that the last message sent in A equals f(x; y) is strictly greater than 1=2, the parties can determine f(x; y) (with no errors) and send it as the last message. Thus A 0 is a deterministic protocol for computing f. We now show that A 0 is (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private. Let (x; y 1 ) and (x; y 2 ) satisfy f(x; y 1 ) = f(x; y 2 ) and h 1 (x; y 1 ) = h 1 (x; y 2 ). Since A is weakly (f h 1 ; f h 2 )-private, the distributions of messages A(x;y 1 ) 6 De nition 7: The revealed information required for computing f is I c (f) def = minflog 2 jrange(h)j : f is weakly h-private g :
The additional information required for computing f, is E(f) def = I c (f) ? log 2 jrange(f)j : Note that a function is privately-computable if and only if I c (f) = log 2 jrange(f)j, i.e., if and only if E(f) = 0.
Our rst result is a trivial relation between the communication complexity of a function and its privacy cost.
Lemma 1: For every f, I c (f) C D (f) : Proof: Let A be a deterministicprotocol computing f and achieving C D (f). View A as a function over f0;1g n f0;1g n . Clearly, A is an A-private protocol for f, and log jrange(A)j C D (f).
As could be expected, this simple bound is not tight. Examples 1 and 2 (Section 5) show that there are functions whose communication complexity is n + 1 but their privacy cost is only log n.
Related Results
We will use the following de nitions and results. View the function f as the 2 n 2 n matrix M f whose (x; y) 0 th entry is f(x; y). A submatrix of M f is a restriction of M f to a set of rows and a set of columns (not necessarily contiguous). A constant submatrix is called monochromatic.
Let M be a matrix. We say that two row indices x 1 and x 2 are related and write x 1 x 2 if there is a coordinate y in which the two rows agree: M x 1 ;y = M x 2 ;y . This relation is clearly re exive and symmetric, we de ne the relation to be the transitive closure of . In a similar way, we de ne the relations and on the matrix columns. A matrix is forbidden if it is not monochromatic, all its rows are in the same equivalence class, and all its columns are in the same equivalence class (with respect to ). The privately-computable functions can be characterized as follows:
Privacy-Characterization Theorem 10, 2] The following are equivalent: (1) f is weakly private, (2) f is strongly private, (3) M f does not contain any forbidden submatrix.
If M f does not contain a forbidden submatrix, it can be recursively decomposed, alternately by rows and by columns, into disjoint submatrices, such that no decomposition partitions an equivalence class, and the nal submatrices are monochromatic. This decomposition corresponds to a tree of submatrices of M f . The root of the tree is M f , the children of every node are either a rowor a column-decomposition of the node, and the leaves are monochromatic matrices. Let d(f) be the minimum depth of such a tree for M f . We have:
Round-Complexity Theorem 10]: d(f) is the minimum number of messages exchanged in a private computation of f. Furthermore, there is a deterministic protocol exchanging this number of messages.
Using this theorem, one can analyze the message-complexity of private functions and construct private functions over f0;1g n f0;1g n requiring up to 2 (2 n ?1) messages in any private computation (the highest achievable value).
input during the execution of A can be inferred from its own input and the value of h(x; y) 1 . De nition 1: A protocol A for f is weakly h{private for P X if for every x; y 1 ; y 2 2 f0;1g n , h(x; y 1 ) = h(x; y 2 ) implies that A(x;y 1 ) and A(x;y 2 ) have the same distribution, namely, for every communication string s, Pr (s = A(x;y 1 )) = Pr (s = A(x;y 2 )) where the probability is taken over the random choices r X and r Y . In the stronger de nition, we require that the protocol make no errors in computing f(x; y) and that the communication on the two instances should be identically distributed given not only the input of each party (x or y), but also given its random choices (r X or r Y ). Formally, De nition 2: A protocol A for f is strongly h{private for P X if
For every x; y 2 f0;1g n :
The communication string A(x;y) of a protocol A on an input (x; y) is the concatenation of the messages sent in the course of the execution of A when P X has x and P Y has y. The pre xfreeness of the messages implies that the communication string can be uniquely decomposed into the individual messages.
A rectangle (in f0;1g n f0;1g n ) is a Cartesian product A B where A; B f0;1g n . The rectangle is f-constant, or monochromatic if f is constant over it. Let A be a deterministic protocol. Fore a string s, de ne A ?1 (s) def = f(x;y) : A(x; y) = sg to be the inverse image of A when viewed as a function over f0;1g n f0;1g n . It can be shown that A ?1 (s) is a rectangle and that if A computes f, then A ?1 (s) is f-constant. We therefore say that a protocol A for f partitions f0;1g n f0;1g n into f-constant rectangles.
The complexity of A is the maximum, over all inputs, of number of bits in their communication string. It is the largest number of bits the two parties may have to exchange when using the protocol. C D (f), the deterministic communication complexity of f, is the smallest complexity of a protocol for f. It is smallest number of bits that two parties computing f must exchange the worst case.
In randomized protocols, the two parties are allowed to randomize their transmissions and their decision as to the value of f. Still we require that in every round of communication, the set of all possible messages be pre x-free.
It is convenient (and, for our purposes, equivalent) to assume that prior to the commencement of communication each party makes a random choice that is independent of its (and the other party's) input. We can then assume that each message is determined by previous messages and by its transmitting party's input and initial random choice.
The communication string A(x;y) of a randomized protocol A on an input (x; y) is again the concatenation of all messages transmitted during an execution of A when P X has x and P Y has y. This time, however, A(x;y) is a random string.
At the end of communication, each party decides on the value of f, which again is a random variable. It is convenient to require that the two parties always agree on this random value which we denote by L A (x; y). Since we are not concerned with the number of transmitted bits, this is easy to achieve | for example, P X can transmit L A (x; y) at the end of communication. We say that A computes f, or is a protocol for f, if for all x; y 2 f0;1g n , Pr (L A (x; y) = f(x; y)) > 1 2 : by taking expectations, one can de ne the complexity of f, very much like we did for deterministic protocols, but we will not use this measure.
I c
We present two formalizations for the privacy cost of f | a weak de nition and a stronger one. Other measures are introduced in section 7.
Let h, like f, be a function of two n-bit strings. Intuitively, we say that a protocol A for f reveals at most h, or is h-private, if all the information that a given party learns about the other Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson 3] initiated the study of privately-computable functions and presented a function that is not privately computable. Chor and Kushilevitz 4] characterized the privately computable Boolean functions. Subsequently, Kushilevitz 10] and Beaver 2] gave a complete characterization of the (general valued) privately-computable functions. It followed from these characterizations that \most" functions are not privately computable.
For functions that are not privately computable, it is natural to study the minimum amount of information about the individual inputs that must be divulged in their computation. There are several ways to quantify this privacy cost of a function and in this paper we consider three of them: a combinatorial measure I c , an information-theoretic measure I i , and a measure I c?i that has both combinatorial and information-theoretic aspects.
For concreteness, we rst de ne (Section 3) and analyze (Sections 4 and 5) I c . Following are some of the results obtained. Every Boolean function f over f0;1g n f0;1g n can be computed while revealing at most n + 1 information bits: P X transmits x and P Y responds by transmitting f(x; y); therefore I c (f) n + 1. We show that for most such functions this bound is tight: I c (f) n ? log n ? 3. We prove linear lower bounds on I c (f) for some explicit functions, including an n=2 ? 2 lower bound for all functions whose function matrix is of Hadamard type (e.g., inner product modulo 2), and show that the privacy cost of the identity and comparison functions are about log n.
Every function can be computed by exchanging just two messages. Kushilevitz 10] showed that certain functions require up to 2 n+1 messages to be computed privately. One may ask whether compromising some privacy can help reduce the number of messages required. In Section 6 we show that, at the cost of revealing k extra bits of information, any function can be computed using O(k 2 (2n+1)=(k+1) ) messages. Furthermore, for some functions, even a single extra bit of revealed information can decrease the number of messages required from 2 n+1 to 2.
In Section 7 we de ne and investigate I i and I c?i . Among other results, we prove that I i (f) I c?i (f) I c (f) for every function f, and that for most Boolean functions over f0;1g n f0;1g n , including inner product modulo 2, I c?i (f) and I i (f) are about n=2.
The next section brie y introduces the communication model. Section 8 contains some concluding remarks.
Introduction
Let f be a function of two n-bit inputs, x and y. Two honest parties, P X holding x and P Y having y, each with unlimited computing power, communicate to determine f(x; y). Each party wants to keep as much of its input secret from the other party.
For some privately computable functions this can be done without revealing any more information about each input than is implied by the value of the function and the other input. For example, if x = (x 1 ; : : :;x n ), y = (y 1 ; : : : ;y n ), and f(x; y)
is the total Hamming weight of x and y, then P X can transmit the Hamming weight of x, while P Y transmits the Hamming weight of y. Each party can now compute f(x; y), and none has gained more information about the other party's input than is implied by f(x; y) and the input it holds.
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